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Maggio: Criminal Accountability

THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: AN INTERSECTION OF
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY AND CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Nicholas J. Maggio*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 21, 2018, President Donald Trump’s former
personal attorney, Michael Cohen, admitted in federal court that
President Trump ordered him to pay two women during the 2016
campaign for the principal purpose of influencing the election.1 This
is a recent development that was exposed during the special counsel
investigation into whether Russia interfered with the 2016 United
States Presidential elections.
On March 22, 2019, the Special Counsel concluded the
investigation into coordination between the Trump election campaign
and Russian officials and, more specifically, whether President Trump
obstructed justice by lying or withholding information during the
ongoing investigation.2 Attorney General William Barr submitted a
summary of the report’s principal conclusions to Congress on March
24, 2019. In pertinent part, the summary reads that “the investigation
did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or
coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference
activities.”3 Further, the summary of the Special Counsel report reads

* I want to thank the remarkable staff of the Touro Law Review and the faculty of Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Touro Law Center. The Touro Law Review staff has helped tremendously in
editing this Note for publication. The faculty at Touro Law School has been kind enough to
guide my writing for this Note. Without them, this would not be published.
1 William K. Rashbaum et al., Michael Cohen Says He Arranged Payments to Women at
Trump’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyreg
ion/michael-cohen-plea-deal-trump.html.
2 John Kruzel, Read Attorney General William Barr’s Summary of Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s Report, POLITIFACT (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/artic
le/2019/mar/24/read-attorney-general-william-barrs-summary-specia/.
3 Id. at 2.
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that “[t]he Special Counsel therefore did not draw a conclusion—one
way or the other—as to whether the examined conduct constituted
obstruction.”4 Instead, Attorney General William Barr determined that
“the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is
not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstructionof-justice offense.”5
However, the summary notes that the “Special Counsel also
referred several matters to other offices for further action.”6
Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York are still working with
Michael Cohen. Most notable about Mr. Cohen’s admission is that it
directly implicates the President as a co-conspirator in a proven federal
crime.7 Federal prosecutors handling Mr. Cohen’s case typically have
the authority to indict any co-conspirators. However, it remains
unclear whether a sitting United States president can be indicted.
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a redacted version
of the Special Counsel’s report to the public on April 18, 2019. It is
nearly 450 pages and is divided into two volumes. The first volume
“describes the factual results of the Special Counsel’s investigation of
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and its
interactions with the Trump Campaign.”8 The second volume
“addresses the President’s actions towards the FBI’s investigation into
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related
matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel’s investigation.”9
The report details two ultimate conclusions. First, “while the
investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties
to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump
4

Id. at 3.
Id. Worth noting is that William Barr wrote an unsolicited report on June 8, 2018
criticizing the Special Counsel investigation. In it, Barr argues that charging obstruction of
justice without establishing an underlying crime requires a high bar. President Trump then
nominated William Barr to be Attorney General. William Barr was confirmed. Barr’s
summary of the Special Counsel report explains that part of his rationale for not charging the
President with obstruction of justice is that fact that the Special Counsel did not establish an
underlying crime.
6 Id.
7 Aaron Blake, Michael Cohen’s Plea Deal is Very Bad for Trump, WASH. POST (Aug. 21,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/21/why-cohen-plea-deal-is-bad-tru
mp-it-puts-him-very-close-an-actual-crime/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d44a53a1ec1c
(discussing Mr. Cohen’s pleading guilty to eight counts of financial crimes).
8 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, vol. I, p.2 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT].
9 Id. at vol. I, p.3.
5
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Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal
charges” for coordination between the two entities.10 Second, the
report reads that “[b]ecause [the Special Counsel] determined not to
make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, [the Special Counsel] did
not draw ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct” as it
relates to an obstruction of justice charge.11 However, the reports
makes clear that
At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough
investigation of the facts that the President clearly did
not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state.
Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards,
we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly,
while this report does not conclude that the President
committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.12
Still, it is unclear whether the Constitution permits prosecutors
to indict a sitting president. Normally, prosecutors can try to indict an
alleged criminal offender after presenting sufficient evidence to a
grand jury. Mueller decided not to indict President Trump on an
obstruction of justice charge only after accepting the Office of Legal
Counsel’s legal conclusions on indicting a sitting president.13 It
appears that Mueller only accepted this view because of “the Special
Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework
of the Special Counsel regulations.”14
In 1973, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) issued a memo arguing that a sitting president could not be
indicted.15 It reiterated this argument in 2000 after President Clinton’s
sex scandal.16 The OLC contended that the nature of criminal
proceedings, including the indictment process, would unduly interfere
with the conduct of the president.17 The memos equated an indictment
10

Id. at vol. I, p.9.
Id. at vol. II, p.8.
12 Id. at vol. II, p.182.
13 Id. at vol. II, p.1.
14 Id.
15 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, AMENABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE
PRESIDENT AND OTHER CIVIL OFFICERS TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHILE IN OFFICE
(1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf [hereinafter 1973 OLC Memo].
16 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, A SITTING PRESIDENT’S AMENABILITY TO
INDICTMENT AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (2000), https://www.justice.gov/file/19351/downlo
ad [hereinafter 2000 OLC Memo].
17 Id.
11
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to an incapacitation of the president.18 Accordingly, the memos
concluded that indicting a sitting president would unconstitutionally
impair the executive from executing his constitutional obligations.19
It remains uncertain whether these memos are official DOJ
policies, despite the fact that the OLC argues that the DOJ is bound by
the OLC’s conclusions.20 Robert Mueller, the head of the special
investigation, followed these memos as they relate to bringing an
indictment.21 Nevertheless, legal scholars disagree whether the memos
are legally binding on prosecutors and the Special Counsel.22 For
instance, the arguments set forth in these memos are not settled law as
they are found in neither statutes nor case law. However, some legal
scholars have concluded a sitting president may in fact be indicted.23
No court, including the Supreme Court of the United States, has heard
a case or ruled on whether a sitting president can be indicted.
This Note argues that prosecutors can indict a sitting president
and that the Supreme Court should decide the constitutionality of the
indictment in a subsequent appeal, despite the OLC’s clear opposition
to such prosecutorial action. The OLC memos should not preclude the
nation’s highest court from hearing this issue. Prosecutors should
proceed with the indictment because the consequences of allowing a
criminally inclined president to maintain executive power outweigh
the bureaucratic inconveniences the OLC cites in its memos. The
abhorrent offense to western notions of justice, accountability, and
morality alone justify holding a criminal president liable for his
criminal conduct.
Further, article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the United States
Constitution provides the precedential conditions and procedures for

18

Id.
Id.
20 Andrew Crespo, Is Mueller Bound by OLC’s Memos on Presidential Immunity?,
LAWFARE (July 25, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mueller-bound-olcs-mem
os-Presidential-immunity; 9-27.000 - Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution (last updated Feb.
2018).
21
MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. I, p.1.
22 Crespo, supra note 20.
23 Deanna Paul, Nancy Pelosi says Trump Is Not Immune from Indictment. Some Legal
Experts Agree., WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/0
1/03/nancy-pelosi-says-trump-is-not-immune-indictment-some-legal-experts-agree/?noredire
ct=on&utm_term=.93669aa9cd8a.
19
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replacing a sitting president.24 Specifically, the clause details that a
president’s “inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office”
shall allow for a new officer to act as the president until the disability
(i.e., the interference with presidential duties because of a criminal
prosecution) is removed or a new president is elected.25 Clauses 3 and
4 of the 25th Amendment further clarify replacement procedures when
a president can no longer discharge his duties.26 Thus, if an indictment
would interfere with the president’s discharging his constitutional
duties, administration officials should utilize the provisions already in
place. Accordingly, the United States government should use the
framework already in place.
This Note is divided into nine parts. Part II introduces
applicable portions of the United States Constitution, as well as
Congressional documents, that relate to removal and replacement of a
president. Part III provides an overview of Supreme Court cases that
examine presidential privilege from legal proceedings, such as civil
and criminal lawsuits, depositions, and subpoenas. Part IV focuses
exclusively on the 25th Amendment, its history, and the instances
when presidents invoked the rights thereunder. Part V of this Note
concentrates on Justice Kavanaugh’s writings and interviews
addressing presidential indictment. The author will further assess how
Justice Kavanaugh might rule if the issue of indicting a sitting
president came before the Supreme Court. Part VI lays out two OLC
memos and an OLC opinion, its conclusions, its reasoning, and under
what political climate the OLC wrote them. Part VII emphasizes the
idea that an indictment against a sitting president is a disability, which
allows an administration to invoke the procedures under the 25th
Amendment. In Part VIII, the author argues that granting the president
immunity from criminal indictments undercuts foundational notions of
accountability and morality in western culture. Lastly, Part IX
24

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
25 Id.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them
a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.”).
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concludes with a discussion on the philosophical, political, and societal
reasons in favor of indicting a president for his criminal conduct while
he is in office.
II.

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

There are no constitutional provisions dealing with whether a
sitting president can be criminally indicted, nor do the recorded
discussions during the Constitutional Convention help clarify the
issue.27 Instead, the Constitution provides for the conditions under
which a president may be removed from office.
Article 2, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution reads, in
relevant part: “In [c]ase of the . . . [i]nability to discharge the [p]owers
and [d]uties of the said [o]ffice . . . the Congress may by [l]aw provide
the [c]ase of [r]emoval.”28 The records of the Federal Convention do
not provide much clarity concerning how criminal indictments relate
to this provision.29 Most of the debate around the clause focuses on
who is charged with appointing a replacement and who that officer
might be.30
Thus, the lack of constitutional text, statutes, and case law on
the subject forces one to turn towards other sources of authority. Some
early analysis of the Constitution highlights how our government
allows for indictments of officials, in contrast to the English system.31
For instance, Patrick Henry, an American attorney and Founding
Father, gave a speech suggesting that a president could be indicted
while in office.32 Mr. Henry signified again, in a debate about adopting
27

Eric M. Freedman, The Law As King and the King As Law: Is A President Immune from
Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 15, 16 (1992) (“In
a system of representative democracy, The Law is us. Subjecting our highest officeholder to
The Law thus represents our collective determination to be responsible for our own destiny.”);
id. at 68 (“Legal decisionmakers should reject the position that the President should have a
blanket immunity from criminal prosecutions. The argument in favor of immunity is
inconsistent with the history, structure, and underlying philosophy of our government, at odds
with precedent, and unjustified by practical considerations.”).
28 Supra note 24.
29 See generally THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Max Farrand ed., 1911),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-3vols.
30
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 125-26 (2d
ed. 1829), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs9.html.
31 Id.
32 Speech of Patrick Henry (June 5, 1788), AM. HIST., http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/
1786-1800/the-anti-federalist-papers/speech-of-patrick-henry-(june-5-1788).php (last visited
Apr. 9, 2019) (“The Honorable Gentleman who presides, told us, that to prevent abuses in our
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the federal constitution, that a president should not be immune from
indictment.33 Modern legal scholars recognize these founding figures’
conclusions that a president should not enjoy immunity from
indictment while in office.34
Further, the Constitution contemplates holding a president
subject to indictments. Specifically, article 1, section 3, clause 7 reads,
in pertinent part, that “[j]udgment in [c]ases of [i]mpeachment shall
not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any [o]ffice of honor, [t]rust or [p]rofit under the United
States . . . nevertheless, the [p]arty convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to [i]ndictment, [t]rial, [j]udgment, and [p]unishment
according to [l]aw.”35 The first sentence of this constitutional
provision signifies that an impeached officer will not hold a future
office. Authorities interpreting the latter part of the provision are
scarce.
However, a basic linguistic analysis of this latter part of the
provision’s language lends itself to the conclusion that impeachment
does not preclude indictment. After explaining the punishment for
impeachment, the word “nevertheless” controls the following
sentence. The word “nevertheless” conditions the entire article 1,
section 3, clause 7. One could restate article 1, section 3, clause 7 to
say that, while cases of impeachment may not extend beyond removal
from office, the subject of impeachment is still liable to indictments,
trials, judgments, and punishment. This is a forward-looking
provision. That is to say, the provision contemplates one’s liability
after conviction. It is silent prior to conviction. Ultimately, article 1,
section 3, clause 7 explains that an officer is still liable to instruments
and procedures of a criminal trial. Moreover, one might reason that
the Constitution explicitly makes the president an indictable officer.
Additionally, there is an argument to be made that an
indictment can only follow a conviction of impeachment. After all,
Government, we will assemble in Convention, recall our delegated powers, and punish our
servants for abusing the trust reposed in them. Oh, Sir, we should have fine times indeed, if
to punish tyrants, it were only sufficient to assemble the people.”).
33 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/elliot-the-debatesin-the-several-state-conventions-vol-3.
34 Freedman, supra note 27, at 13-15, 68 (“Legal decisionmakers should reject the position
that the President should have a blanket immunity from criminal prosecutions. The argument
in favor of immunity is inconsistent with the history, structure, and underlying philosophy of
our government, at odds with precedent, and unjustified by practical considerations.”).
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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part of the clause reads that “the [p]arty convicted” shall be “liable and
subject to [i]ndictment.”36 One could conclude that the past tense use
of the word “convicted” means an indictment must wait until
conviction of impeachment.
Yet, history reveals that a president may be impeached and not
removed from office.37 The clause does not talk about whether a
president must be removed in order to be indicted. Thus, the clause
allows for a convicted, yet sitting, president to be indicted.
Further, the United States House of Representatives (“House”)
authorized Lewis Deschler, then a parliamentarian of the House, “‘to
compile and prepare . . . precedents’ of the House for purposes of
analysis.”38 These compilations consist of 17 volumes, 33 chapters,
and thousands of pages of analysis regarding congressional precedents
on nearly every matter.39 In 1976, Deschler reviewed House
precedents from 1936 to 1973, and historically relevant documents in
writing these volumes.40 Chapter 14 of what are known as “Deschler’s
Precedents” speaks about impeachment, its origins, historical context,
and its aims.41
The impeachment section notes that “impeachment is not
personal punishment,” but a “process which primarily functions to
maintain constitutional government.”42 Deschler goes on to write how
“impeachment does not immunize the officer from criminal liability
for his wrongdoing.”43
He cites two arguments that claim
impeachment is separate from the purposes of criminal
accountability.44 Nowhere in Deschler’s Precedents does he claim that
an indictment must follow impeachment proceedings or that a
president is immunized from indictments while in office.

36

Id.
Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, The Senate Acquits President Clinton, WASH. POST (Feb.
13, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/impeach0
21399.htm.
38 About Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, GOV’T PRINTING OFF.,
https://www.gpo.gov/help/about_precedents_of_the_us_house_of_representatives.htm (last
updated Mar. 6, 2018).
39 Id.
40
Id.
41 See
generally LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS ch. 14 (1976),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/gpo-hprec-deschlers-v3/pdf/gpo-hprec-deschlers-v3.pdf.
42 Id. at 2269.
43 Id.
44 Id.
37
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Deschler attempts to divorce criminal accountability from
impeachment and constitutional considerations as much as possible.45
He references criminality as an inappropriate standard for an
impeachable offense.46 Deschler goes on to write how criminality is
incompatible with the framers’ intent and how criminal law serves a
fundamentally different purpose from impeachment.47 Thus, one
should not look to impeachment provisions as precluding the criminal
indictment of a president. Instead, one should consider basic notions
of criminal law, policy, and moral implications, alongside the openness
of the Constitution, for indictments.
The provisions of the
Constitution, as Deschler notes, are primarily concerned with
maintaining a “constitutional government.”48
III.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The United States Supreme Court has considered the
boundaries of presidential immunity from criminal proceedings on one
notable occasion. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Nixon.49 In Nixon, the Court held that a president would enjoy no
privilege from producing relevant evidence in a criminal trial when
citing only a general interest in confidentiality.50 In fact, the Court
recognized the existence of executive privilege, but decided it was a
qualified, not absolute, privilege.51
In 1974, a grand jury indicted several individuals for crimes
against the government, including conspiracy to defraud the United
States and obstruction of justice.52 The indictment named President
Richard Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.53 The Special
Prosecutor filed a subpoena requiring the production of evidence
45 Id. at 2269, 2270 (“Impeachment and the criminal law serve fundamentally different
purposes.”); id. at 2269 (“The general applicability of the criminal law also makes it
inappropriate as the standard for a process applicable to a highly specific situation such as
removal of a President.”); id. at 2270 (“A requirement of criminality would be incompatible
with the intent of the framers to provide a mechanism broad enough to maintain the integrity
of constitutional government.”).
46 Id. at 2269.
47 Id. at 2269, 2270.
48
Id. at 2270.
49 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 687.
53 Id.
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relating to precisely identified meetings with the President and other
individuals.54 President Nixon filed a motion to quash the subpoena
based upon a formal claim of privilege.55 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the motion.56
In its analysis, the Court offered several principles on
presidential privilege from judicial proceedings such as complying
with subpoenas, depositions, and giving testimony.57
Most
noteworthy, perhaps, is the Court’s conclusion that “neither the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality . . .
can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process.”58 Among the justifications for this holding is
the idea that such privilege would “plainly conflict with the function
of courts under Art. III” in their constitutional duty to “do justice in
criminal prosecutions.”59 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that “the
needs of judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege.”60
However, it appears that such needs do not include holding a
president accountable for damages stemming from his official conduct.
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.61 There, the Court held that former President
Nixon benefited from an absolute immunity to damages liability
predicated on his official conduct (i.e., approving of the government’s
asking Mr. Fitzgerald to resign).62 The Court further extended this
privilege to the outer perimeter of the president’s official
responsibility.63
An executive branch official sued Nixon and claimed he was
demoted for exercising his First Amendment right to speak out about
54

Id.
Id. at 683 (“The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively
privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the
presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17(c) had been satisfied.”); id. at 684. (“Neither
the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute unqualified presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”).
56 Id. at 689.
57 Id.
58
Id. at 706.
59 Id. at 707.
60 Id.
61 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
62 Id.
63 Id.
55
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cost overruns within his department.64 This occurred in the context of
a reduction in size and funding of the Air Force.65 Prior to the
President’s statement, Fitzgerald testified in Congress to unjustifiably
high costs and difficulties concerning the Air Force’s new aircrafts.66
Consequently, the Air Force reassigned Fitzgerald shortly after giving
this testimony.67 According to the Court, this reassignment met
resistance from Fitzgerald’s supervising officials.68 Nixon claimed
personal responsibility for the actions against Fitzgerald.69 Thus,
Fitzgerald sought damages against Nixon.70 However, President
Nixon argued that he enjoyed a presidential immunity from a suit for
actions taken during his official tenure.71 Both the district and circuit
courts denied the President’s claim.72 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.73
In its decision, the Court reasoned that there is a public interest
in “providing an official ‘the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and
impartially with’ the duties of his office.”74 A president would be an
“easy target” for civil suits given the notoriety associated with the
office.75 Further, the tempers and contours associated with litigation
could “distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment” of
both the President and nation at large.76 In sum, the Court found that
a president is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil liability in a
suit for damages predicated on his official actions.77
Finally, the case of Clinton v. Jones78 is the last prominent suit
when considering the limits of presidential immunity from judicial
proceedings. In Jones, Paula Jones sued then-President Bill Clinton.79
Ms. Jones alleged that the President made “‘abhorrent’ sexual
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 752 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
Id. at 752.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 751.
520 U.S. 681 (1997).
Id.
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advances to her while he served as Governor of Arkansas.”80 She
further alleged that her rejection of those advances resulted in
retaliatory punishment by her supervisors.81 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the President’s
motion to dismiss but granted temporary immunity until he left
office.82 The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
dismissed in part.83 The Court granted the President’s petition for
certiorari.84 The Court held that the Constitution does not afford the
President immunity from civil damages litigation stemming from
events that occurred before he took office.85
In its reasoning, the Court highlighted the difference between
official and unofficial conduct.86 The Court emphasized that immunity
concerning official conduct only extends to functions of the office.87
It is not concerned with the actor, but rather the “function
performed.”88
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, remarked how
historical evidence shows James Wilson, a participant in the
Philadelphia Convention (where the Constitution was drafted), argued
how the president is amenable to laws as a private citizen for his private
conduct and a public officer by impeachment.89 The Court
acknowledged that this approach is consistent with the doctrine of
presidential immunity and the claim in this case.90
80
81
82
83

Id. at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 682.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial
postponement as the “functional equivalent” of a grant of temporary
immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court
explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws
that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official
was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the
rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal, private
conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument
that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with
the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers.

Id.
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 696.
Id.
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Most important, perhaps, is the Court’s conclusion that “the
separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.”91 In other
words, the Court recognized that each branch is charged with specific
duties. Further, the Court was sensitive to the role each branch plays
in checking one another. However, the Court stood firm in the position
that those checks should never detrimentally affect another branch’s
ability to perform its duties. In response to President Clinton’s
argument, the Court stressed that the vast and important duties of his
office demanded his devotion and undivided attention for the public
interest.92 The Court accepted this premise.93
The Court disagreed with what followed from the separationof-powers doctrine. Significantly, the Court wrote how the President
erred in his conclusion that interactions between the judicial and
executive branches rose to the level of unconstitutional impairment.94
The Court referenced instances of presidents’ effectively responding
to court orders to provide video-taped testimony, give depositions, and
comply with subpoenas.95 Justice Stevens concluded that such
interactions between the branches can “scarcely be thought a
novelty.”96 Accordingly, the Court held that the Constitution does not
grant a sitting President immunity from civil damages litigation arising
from events that occurred before he took office.97
The Jones case provides powerful precedent and reasoning to
support holding a sitting president accountable under the law. While
that case dealt particularly with civil litigation, many of the cited
instances between the judicial and executive branches dealt with
criminal proceedings.98 The Court explicitly contemplated the
president’s amenability to criminally related judicial proceedings. It
stands to reason that the Supreme Court could use much of that
opinion’s dicta and rulings to find similar liability concerning criminal
trials for a sitting president.

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 702.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 710.
See generally id.
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Other Supreme Court cases offer guidance on how the Court
might rule on presidential immunity from criminal liability while in
office. For example, in United States v. Lee,99 the Supreme Court
wrote that “[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law.
All officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound by it.”100 The Court refused to
grant blanket immunity from the law to government officials, no
matter their position.101
In Burton v. United States,102 the Supreme Court held that a
United States Senator may be criminally indicted for accepting
compensation in which the United States is an interested party.103 The
Court reasoned that such a law neither offends the Constitution nor
interferes with the legitimate authority of Congress. 104 Elected
officials are amenable to criminal indictments.
The Court need not turn to the historical instances cited in
Jones alone. Our Constitution provides tools and procedures for
replacing a president under a host of circumstances. Specifically, the
25th Amendment stands as one final tool in removing a criminally
inclined president if the Court finds a sitting president may not be
indicted.
IV.

INDICTMENT AS A DISABILITY
A.

The 25th Amendment

The 25th Amendment assuages some concerns regarding the
alleged harms to government that may arise from subjecting a

99

106 U.S. 196 (1882).
Id. at 241.
101 Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President be Criminally Indicted?, 30
SW. U. L. REV. 417 (2001).
102 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
103 Id. at 367.
There can be no reason why the Government may not, by legislation,
protect each Department against such evils, indeed, against everything,
from whatever source it proceeds, that tends or may tend to corruption of
inefficiency in the management of public affairs. A Senator cannot claim
immunity from legislation directed to that end, simply because he is a
member of a body which does not own its existence to Congress, and with
whose constitutional functions there can be no interference.
Id.
104 Id.
100
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president to criminal litigation. The 25th Amendment serves to clarify
the order of succession and procedures for replacing a president.
However, there is a lack of law or precedent that helps define when the
amendment can be invoked. In relevant part, section 3 of the 25th
Amendment reads:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either
the principal officers of the executive departments or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.105
Before passing the 25th Amendment, Congress consulted with
legal scholars to determine what qualifies as an inability under the
Constitution.106 Congress also considered who should determine what
a disability is.107 Various letters from legal professionals argue that a
disability encompasses both physical and mental inability to discharge
the duties of the president.108 Some letters contend that a disability
should be defined as what the founders could have medically
contemplated at the time.109 However, others argue that it is a practical
matter concerning whether the president is discharging the duties of
his office.110
Only a small pool of presidents have had their powers removed
under the 25th Amendment. In 1985, President Reagan penned a letter
charging then-Vice President George H.W. Bush with executing
presidential powers and duties.111 This preceded President Reagan’s

105

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added.)
H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 6, 15 (Comm.
Print. 1956), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=twent
yfifth_amendment_congressional_materials [hereinafter Hearings].
107 Id.
108 Id. at 15, 17, 18.
109 Id. at 26.
110 Id. at 15, 18.
111 Ronald Reagan, Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House on the President’s Resumption of His Powers and Duties Following Surgery, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 13, 1985), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-thepresident-pro-tempore-the-senate-and-the-speaker-the-house-the-presidents.
106
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impending surgery that would leave him temporarily incapacitated.112
President Reagan resumed his powers shortly after his surgery.113
Similarly, in 2002, President George W. Bush penned a letter
discharging his duties to the Vice President under the 25th
Amendment.114 This letter also preceded a medical procedure that
required sedation.115 President Bush discharged his duties again in
2007 before another routine medical procedure that required
sedation.116 He resumed his powers shortly thereafter both times.117
The use of the 25th Amendment lends support to the idea that the
Constitution provides for the replacement of a disabled president.
B.

History of the 25th Amendment

History suggests that the 25th Amendment’s 3rd and 4th
clauses are reserved for medical incapacitation. Even in letters to
Congress before drafting the Amendment, legal scholars argued that a
disability could only be understood as the founders understood
intellectual illness.118 Yet, others argued that the inability to discharge
duties should extend to practical matters such as motor functions and
tasks associated with those motor functions.119
Mental or physical impairments should trigger the 25th
Amendment only when a president cannot effectively advocate for the
interests of this nation. Imagine the officer who cannot walk but leads
a country through a war and lifts the nation out of an economic
depression.120 Administration officials should not be concerned with
disabilities that do not impair an officer’s ability to produce a quality

112

Id.
Id.
114 George W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of the Powers
and Duties of President of the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 29, 2002),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-temporarytransfer-the-powers-and-duties-president-the-united.
115 Id.
116 George W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers and Duties
of the President of the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 21, 2007),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-the-temporarytransfer-the-powers-and-duties-the-president.
117 Id.
118 Hearings, supra note 106.
119 Id.
120 Franklin D. Roosevelt- Key Events, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/preside
nt/franklin-d-roosevelt/key-events (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
113
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work product.121 Such officials should be solely concerned with
circumstances that afflict an officer’s ability to effectively advocate for
the interests of this nation. If a condition, either mental, physical, or
legal,122 prevents a president from discharging his duties in any way,
he should be considered disabled under the 25th Amendment.
An indictment can impair the president’s ability to function in
much the same way as an incapacitating operation. An arraignment
follows an indictment which forces the individual to appear before a
judge, enter a plea, and potentially lead to a jury trial. An indictment
can lead to an arrest and imprisonment. An indictment can result in
compliance with different court orders such as subpoenas, gag orders,
and other judicial procedures. An individual is involuntarily held at a
variety of locations and prohibited from enjoying fundamental rights
such as speech and privacy when complying with the judicial process
that attends an indictment. A president would not be able to effectively
discharge his powers while complying with an indictment.
Accordingly, bringing an indictment against a sitting president would
fall within the circumstances contemplated by Congress and legal
scholars surveyed for the scope of 25th Amendment.
Furthermore, there might be no greater disability than death.
An inquiry into what an administration may accomplish under the
stress caused from the passing of a sitting president could be gathered
from the actions taken by the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson
administrations. The achievements of those administrations serve as
testaments to the idea that, even in death, the government can carry on
in its duties.
In the wake of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, thenVice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the office of President.123
In fact, President Kennedy’s assassination instigated a discussion in

121 Armond S Goldman et al., What Was the Cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
Paralytic Illness?, 11 J. MED. BIOGRAPHY 232 (2003), https://www.ehdp.com/out/jmb_2003_
v11_p232-240.pdf
122 Hearings, supra note 106, at 14 (“These well established rules point to a definition of
‘inability’ which covers all cases in which the President is in fact unable to exercise a power
which the public interest requires to be exercised. The cause and duration of the inability are
immaterial—the question is one of fact.”); id. at 18 (“Inability is a practical concept-an
impairment such that the powers and duties cannot effectively be discharged.”).
123 Kent Germany, Lyndon B. Johnson: Impact and Legacy, U. VA. MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/impact-and-legacy (last visited Apr. 9, 2019)
[hereinafter Johnson].
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Congress that culminated in the ratification of the 25th amendment.124
Despite the unexpected death, President Johnson oversaw the passage
of dramatic civil rights legislation encompassed within the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and budget reform in the Revenue Act of 1964.125 Prior
to his assassination, President Kennedy prioritized and pushed for
enactment of these bills during his presidency.126 Still, after his
assassination and in the wake of such tragedy, the administration
reorganized and urged sweeping government reformation.
History demonstrates that a government can continue to thrive
in the absence of the elected president, and a president can still be
effective while attending to legal proceedings. In December of 1998,
the House introduced articles of impeachment against President Bill
Clinton.127 The Senate acquitted him in February of 1999.128 Yet,
President Clinton arguably had a presidency marked by domestic and
foreign political achievements. He enjoyed a 68% approval rating and
a 72% rating among Americans who believed he could be effective and
lead successful foreign policy endeavors.129 Moreover, after rallying
the nation’s support, President Clinton deployed troops to Serbia in
March of 1999, a month after his impeachment proceeding.130 This
initiative successfully led Dictator Slobodan Milosevic to pull troops
out of Kosovo.131 This achievement also complemented domestic
accomplishments. For instance, President Clinton, a member of the
Democratic Party, was able to negotiate with the Republican Party and
agreed on paying dues to the United Nations, doubling afterschool
programs, and implementing the 100,000 Teacher Initiative.132

124 Scott Bomboy, How JFK’s Assassination Led to a Constitutional Amendment, NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-jfks-assassination-ledto-a-constitutional-amendment/.
125 Johnson, supra note 123.
126 Id.
127 Daniel H. Erskine, The Trial of Queen Caroline and the Impeachment of President
Clinton: Law As a Weapon for Political Reform, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 2
(2008).
128 Baker & Dewar, supra note 37.
129 Presidential Approval Ratings – Bill Clinton, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116
584/Presidential-approval-ratings-bill-clinton.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
130 Samuel J. Sarver, Effects of the Impeachment on Bill Clinton’s Staff, Cabinet, Agenda,
and Legacy, ILL. ST. U., https://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2006/Sarver
13.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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Overall, in President Clinton’s case, attending to legal
proceedings did not debilitate him and prevent him from executing his
duties. One might reasonably point to many factors outside of
President Clinton’s control that influenced his favorable poll
numbers.133 Most prominent, perhaps, is the proliferation of the
internet, websites, and cyber-commerce.134
However, the
consequences of legal proceedings did not appear to impair the
credibility or function of the government.
Furthermore, insulating a president from indictment allows for
a likely criminal actor to continue exercising great powers in our
nation’s highest office. The 25th Amendment provides the procedure
for an administration to initiate a process which could be used to hold
a criminal president liable for his actions.
Nixon’s presidency reflects the consequences that occur when
a criminally inclined sitting president maintains executive power.135
For example, Nixon secured funds to bankroll cover-ups of the
Watergate scandal because of his presidential position.136 In fact, he
further engaged in cover-ups of those cover-ups.137 These schemes
spanned two terms.138 However, an indictment could have stopped that
conduct sooner than an impeachment.
C.

OLC Memoranda

As previously mentioned, the OLC drafted a memorandum in
1973 arguing that a sitting president could not be indicted.139 The
memo explained that the attention necessary to defend a criminal
indictment would “interfere with the President’s unique duties.”140
Accordingly, the memo concluded that an indictment would frustrate
133

Id.
See CHRISTIAN WOLESCHEID, RISE AND BURST OF THE DOTCOM BUBBLE: CAUSES,
CHARACTERISTICS, EXAMPLES (2012).
135 See generally JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974); BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE
FINAL DAYS (1976).
136 See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S
MEN, supra note 135, BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135.
137
See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S
MEN, supra note 135; BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135.
138 See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S
MEN, supra note 135; BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135.
139 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15.
140 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15.
134
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a president’s ability to carry out his duties to such an extent that any
proceeding should be deferred until after his term.141 In 2000, the OLC
reaffirmed these conclusions with another memorandum.142
Federal prosecutors are expected to follow official DOJ
policies, regulations, and practices; such rules are published in memos
like those mentioned above.143 While it has been an official practice
of the DOJ to refrain from indicting a president, it is unclear whether
doing so is an official policy. Mueller followed the memo’s guidelines
and decided not to indict President Trump despite evidence that
President Trump obstructed justice.144
It stands to reason, though, that an indictment could serve as a
disability. President Bush and President Reagan relinquished their
duties because of their inability to perform presidential duties.145 An
indictment either prohibits a president from discharging his duties,
impairs him, or serves no debilitating purpose. If the latter, then there
is no policy reason that justifies presidential immunity in the OLC
memos. If it is the former, administrations can turn to history, as
presidents have utilized constitutional tools to relinquish their duties
when they cannot discharge them. The argument that an indictment
might impair the president requires nuanced policy consideration, as
will later be addressed in this Note.146
However, in his report, Mueller concluded that obstruction of
justice laws can apply to the president.147 Mueller relied on a footnote
from a 1995 OLC opinion to reach this conclusion.148 In 1995,
President Clinton nominated William Fletcher to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Fletcher’s mother also served as a judge
on that court.149 The OLC then issued an opinion as to whether federal
nepotism statutes applied to presidential appointments.150 The OLC
argued that such statutes should not apply due to the clear statement
141

1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15.
2000 OLC Memo, supra note 16.
143 9-27.000 - Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 20.
144 Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mueller Won’t Indict Trump if He Finds Wrongdoing, Giuliani
Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/muellertrump-indictment.html.
145 Reagan, supra note 111; Bush, supra note 114.
146
See infra Part V.
147 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.169.
148 Josh Blackman, The Special Counsel’s Constitutional Analysis, LAWFARE (APRIL 19,
2019, 12:31PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/special-counsels-constitutional-analysis.
149 Id.
150 Id.
142
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rule.151 In other words, statutes should not apply to presidents unless
the statute explicitly mention its applicability to the president. Since
the statute did not explicitly apply to the president, the OLC concluded
a court should not apply it.152
The OLC qualified its analysis in footnote 11. In pertinent part,
the footnote reads that “the clear statement principle [the OLC has]
identified does not apply with respect to a statute that raises no
separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the
President.”153 The footnote offers a bribery statute as an example of a
law which would not implicate separation of powers questions. The
footnote reads that
Application of [the bribery statute] raises no separation
of powers question, let alone a serious one. The
Constitution confers no power in the President to
receive bribes; in fact, it specifically forbids any
increase in the President’s compensation for his service
while he is in office, which is what a bribe would
function to do. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
Moreover, the Constitution expressly authorizes
Congress to impeach the President for, inter alia,
bribery. Id. § 4. The Constitution further provides that
any party impeached and convicted may ‘nevertheless
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.’ Id. art. I, § 3.154
Mueller argues that “[u]nder OLC’s analysis, Congress can
permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by the President,
such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating
evidence, because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers
questions.”155 The Special Counsel’s report goes on to note that “[t]he
Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such
conduct, and those actions would transgress the President’s duty to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”156 Mueller concludes
151

Id.
Id.
153
WALTER DELLINGER, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, Application of 28
U.S.C. §458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges at n.11 (1995)
https://www.justice.gov/file/20126/download.
154 Id.
155 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.170.
156 Id.
152

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2019], Art. 7

778

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

that in “view of those clearly permissible applications of the
obstruction statutes to the President,” a clear statement rule would not
preclude the obstruction of justice statutes from applying to the
President.157
D.

Current Supreme Court of the United States’ View
on Presidential Indictment

On July 9, 2018, President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh
to the Supreme Court after Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his
retirement.158 On October 6, 2018, the Senate voted to confirm Justice
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court by a vote of 50 to 48.159 Justice
Kavanaugh provides a conservative majority on the nation’s highest
court for potentially decades to come.160
The question of whether a sitting president can be criminally
indicted is an open question in the Supreme Court. There is no case
law on the topic and the issue directly calls for an interpretation of the
Constitution. The results would impact the highest office in our nation.
Predicting how Justice Kavanaugh might rule on such a case is of
particular relevance today. Justice Kavanaugh’s published opinions
on whether a sitting president can be indicted command interest in light
of President Trump’s legal troubles.
In 2009, Justice Kavanaugh penned a law review article in the
Minnesota Law Review titled, “Separation of Powers During the

157

Id.
Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brettkavanaugh-supreme-court.html.
159 Emily Knapp et al., Kavanaugh Confirmed: Here’s How Senators Voted, POLITICO (Oct.
6, 2018) https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirmationvote-count/.
160 Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 808 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
May 20, 2015). https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/425C0AE29F10AFD78
5257E4B00767BF5/$file/13-5368.pdf (Justice Kavanaugh dissented that mandated
contraception coverage in the Affordable Care Act infringed on the rights of religious
organizations.); Brett M. Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 12, 2017). http://www.aei.org/
publication/from-the-bench-the-constitutional-statesmanship-of-chief-justice-william-rehnqu
ist/ (Justice Kavanaugh welcomes the idea of widening the flow of public funding to religious
schools.); EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2012),
rev’d, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (Justice Kavanaugh
rejected the EPA’s attempt to stifle air pollution that crossed state lines).
158
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Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond.”161 In his article, Justice
Kavanaugh cites his experience working on the President Clinton
investigation, as well as his background working in the White
House.162 Justice Kavanaugh outlined a series of policy positions to
improve the federal government’s performance.163
One such
recommendation is that a president be able to defer criminal
proceedings and indictments until out of office.164 He argues that
criminal proceedings would “cripple the federal government” and
render it “unable to function with credibility.”165 Further, Justice
Kavanaugh contends that criminal proceedings would distract a
president from his responsibilities to the people.166
Justice Kavanaugh anticipates two criticisms of his argument.
He first concedes that no one is above the law.167 However, he claims
that the point is not to put people above the law, but to defer litigation
until after a president’s term.168 Second, Justice Kavanaugh recognizes
that the law requires checks-and-balances.169 That is why, Justice
Kavanaugh writes, the Constitution charges Congress with the ability
to impeach a president if he does something “dastardly.”170 While
Justice Kavanaugh’s law review article is not dispositive of how he
might rule now that he is a Supreme Court Justice, it serves to inform
the considerations he might make in such a case.
A future decision on a case considering presidential immunity
from criminal indictment while in office might not fall along
predictable party lines. In Jones, the court held unanimously for the
president’s amenability to civil litigation.171 The majority discussed
how it is not uncommon for a president to comply with subpoenas,

161 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and
Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454 (2009).
162 Id. at 1459.
163 Kevin Russell, Kavanaugh on Presidential Power: Law-review Article on Investigations
of Sitting Presidents (UPDATED), SCOTUS BLOG (July 13, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.co
m/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-Presidential-power-law-review-article-on-investigations-of-sitting
-Presidents/#more-272711.
164 Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1462.
165 Id. at 1461.
166
Id. at 1462.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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depositions, and provide testimony.172 Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Breyer, who all voted with the majority, are
currently sitting on the court.173 Added to those three justices is a
possible vote from Justice Roberts, who was willing to break with his
conservative brethren in the Affordable Care Act case.174
Additionally, they all occupy different positions on the ideological
spectrum. Thus, a plurality opinion in favor of indicting a sitting
president would not be surprising.
On the other hand, Congress could directly enact legislation
that explicitly allows prosecutors to criminally indict a sitting
president.175 Under the presumption it is properly drafted, such a law
may reflect much of the sentiment in the Jones decision. That is to
say, Congress could clarify the judicial branch’s role in the checksand-balances aspect of our government. The Supreme Court has
already opined that prohibiting the judiciary from exercising its power
in the civil realm, barring Fitzgerald, would be an unconstitutional
inhibition.176 It stands to reason that the Court could find the same in
the criminal arena. Lastly, enacting such a law would reinforce the
prevailing sentiment that no one is above the law.177

172

Id.
Id.
174 Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
175 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 367 (1906).
While the framers of the Constitution intended that each department
should keep within its appointed sphere of public action, it was never
contemplated that the authority of the Senate to admit to a seat in its body
one who had been duly elected as a Senator, or its power to expel him after
being admitted, should, in any degree, limit or restrict the authority of
Congress to enact such statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as the
public interests required for carrying into effect the powers granted to it.
Id. at 367. Here, the Court explicitly acknowledges that one’s position in our government does
not preclude Congress from criminalizing behavior and making an elected official amenable
to prosecution for that behavior while in office.
176 Jones, 520 U.S. at 699.
177 Ronald J. Ostrow, ‘No One Is Above the Law,’ Starr Reminds Bar Group, L.A. TIMES
(May 2, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/02/news/mn-45632 (“Independent
counsel Kenneth W. Starr, locked in an executive-privilege battle with President Clinton, on
Friday invoked the words of a Watergate special prosecutor who won a similar struggle with
then-President Nixon: ‘No one—absolutely no one—is above the law.’”); Kenneth L.
Khachigian, It Still Rings True: No Man Is Above Law, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1998),
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/16/local/me-13684 (“These are the very last words in
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski’s best-selling memoir: ‘. . . during the Watergate years [our
Constitution] was interpreted again so as to reaffirm that no one—absolutely no one—is above
the law.’” (alteration in original)).
173
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Justice Kavanaugh’s distaste for special counsel investigations
and indictments of a sitting president are well documented in his
writings and public comments.178 As discussed earlier, he argued
against indicting a sitting president in his Minnesota law review
article.179 In it, he reflected on his tenure with the Kenneth Starr
investigation into President Bill Clinton.180 Drawing on his time in the
White House, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that a president should be
afforded deferment of litigation.181 What is more, Justice Kavanaugh
outlined into the hypothetical, undesirable policy consequences that
could follow a presidential indictment.182 In sum, it seems almost
inevitable that Justice Kavanaugh would rule in favor of expansive
presidential immunity from criminal proceedings if given the
opportunity.
V.

A PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY INQUIRY INTO
PRESIDENTIAL DEFERMENT

One rebuttal to the argument that a president is subject to
criminal prosecution, as Justice Kavanaugh notes, is that Congress is
charged with removing a president when he does something
“dastardly.”183 Because impeachment is a political process, its

178 Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1460 (“But I believe that the President should be excused
from some of the burdens of ordinary citizenship while serving in office.”); Josh Gerstein,
Kavanaugh Signaled Sitting President Couldn’t be Indicted, POLITICO (July 11, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2018/07/11/brett-kavanaugh-presidentindicted-709641 (Video showing Kavanaugh raising his hand in affirmation when asked
whether a president is immune from criminal indictment while sitting in office.).
179 Kavanaugh, supra note 161.
180 Id. at 1460 (“This is not something I necessarily thought in the 1980s or 1990s. Like
many Americans at that time, I believed that the President should be required to shoulder the
same obligations that we all carry. But in retrospect, that seems a mistake.”).
181 Id. at 1459.
182 Id. (“In particular, Congress might consider a law exempting a President—while in
office—from criminal prosecution and investigation, including from questioning by criminal
prosecutors or defense counsel. Criminal investigations targeted at or revolving around a
President are inevitably politicized by both their supporters and critics. As I have written
before, ‘no Attorney General or special counsel will have the necessary credibility to avoid
the inevitable charges that he is politically motivated—whether in favor of the President or
against him, depending on the individual leading the investigation and its results.’”).
183 Id. at 1462. Dastardly means underhanded or treacherous. Justice Kavanaugh writes in
the preceding sentence that “A second possible concern is that the country needs a check
against a bad-behaving or law-breaking President.” Id. He then writes “If the President does
something dastardly, the impeachment process is available.” Id. One might reason that
“dastardly” means “bad-behaving” or “law-breaking” in this context, too. Dastardly,
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instigation is subject to the whims of Congress. Additionally,
conviction also requires a two-thirds majority vote by Congress.
Accordingly, it is possible that a president can commit a federal
offense without removal from office. Consider that President Clinton
perjured himself to a federal prosecutor. The House initiated
impeachment proceedings for two articles of impeachment. However,
the Senate failed to reach the required two-thirds threshold to convict
him.184 It does not necessarily follow that, because a president does
something dastardly, he will be removed from office.
A further policy consideration is whether an executive officer
should be permitted to serve subsequent terms after participating in
criminal activity. In theory, a president could commit a crime his first
day in office, deferring any consequences to the end of his term. But
the president does not lose his status before, during, or after a
reelection. It stands to reason that a president could defer
consequences of a crime for eight years. Note, Nixon won his
reelection campaign after Watergate. An individual with the gambit of
presidential power at his disposal, coupled with a proclivity for crime,
is a threat to any society.
As the OLC memorandums argue, a president should not be
subject to indictment because it would impermissibly chill the
executive’s ability to carry out his constitutionally charged duties.
However, the Court has recognized that chilling effects are too abstract
to bind the administration of justice.185 Moreover, the president is not
charged to carry out criminal behavior. The president is not charged to
suborn perjury, tamper with witnesses, shoot someone on Fifth
Avenue, or act for other corrupt personal motives. These types of
actions are not official conduct of the office. Application of
obstruction statutes (or murder statutes) would not burden official
conduct to the extent that they chill conduct which further corrupts or
obstructs justice. Further, “the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not
aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead,
they impose a discrete limitation on conduct” with the intent to
obstruct justice.186 Thus, “the President’s conduct of office should not

MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dastardly (last visited
Apr. 9, 2019).
184 Baker & Dewar, supra note 37.
185 Freedman, supra note 27 at n. 213.
186 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.180.
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be chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible
application of a corrupt-motive standard.”187
A final consideration is that enabling a prosecutor to indict a
sitting president empowers politically motivated attorneys to indict a
president on purely ideological grounds. However, Mueller’s report
deals with this point explicitly. There is “no reason to believe that
investigations, let alone prosecution, would occur except in highly
unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe
that obstruction occurred.”188 Mueller offers several checks against
“initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former
President.”189 It stands to reason that these checks exist for the
investigation into a sitting president, too. For instance, the “Attorney
General hold[s] ‘the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the
United States Government.’”190 This “provides a strong institutional
safeguard against politicized investigations of prosecutions.”191 There
are similar safeguards for DOJ officers and line prosecutors.192
Once policy arguments are dispensed with, one can then turn
to the question of whether deferring criminal prosecution serves the
ends of justice. Classical philosophers, such as Aristotle, and modern
ones, such as John Rawls, have provided durable theories of
responsibility and justice. Aristotle’s work comports with much of our
criminal law theory today.193 John Rawls’ work offers a contractual
theory of rights and justice that one can use to frame this discussion.194
Deferment of criminal conduct flies in the face of both the
moral responsibility and contract theories of justice. At its core,
deferment of criminal action delays accountability for criminal

187

Id. at vol. II, p. 180.
Id. at vol. II, p. 179.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at vol. II, p.179 n.1092 (“Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of
Justice officers and line prosecutors against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts.
Prosecutors are generally barred from participating in matters implicating their personal
interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to be influenced by their ‘own
professional or personal circumstances,’ Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so prosecutors would not
frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally
motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible
officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an
investigation absent a credible factual basis.”).
193 See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987).
194 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
188
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conduct. For a temporary period, one is outside the reaches of the
nation’s collectively agreed-to laws after participating in collectively
agreed-to criminally deviant behavior. The nation operates under a
mutual understanding that people consent to follow such laws and the
government will enforce them. The question then becomes whether
deferring prosecution of criminal behavior is inherently at odds with
our nation’s idea of accountability.
The mass of presidential powers naturally attends the position
of president. Yet, winning a presidential election does not preclude
one from engaging in criminal conduct. Thus, there could be an
individual with the tendency to violate our laws at the helm of
government, with substantial power, insulated from criminal laws for
the duration of his term.
Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, developed one of the first
accounts of moral responsibility.195 In book III, sections 1 through 5,
Aristotle reasons society should hold someone accountable for his
voluntary acts.196 The voluntary act must: (1) originate in the agent
and (2) the agent must know what he or she is doing or going to bring
about.197 It should come as no surprise that this notion reflects actus
rea and mens rea elements of criminal culpability.198
One can imagine a situation where a candidate for President of
the United States considers all the different tools to deploy in winning
an election. Some tools are well within the scope of legality in our
society. These include fundraising, buying campaign ads, and making
media appearances. However, it would not be unreasonable to imagine
a candidate with a history of violating our laws using tools outside the
scope of legality. These tools might include encouraging a foreign
superpower, on national television, to dedicate its resources towards
hacking a political opponent’s network. That candidate might also
organize a meeting with this foreign superpower to exchange
potentially compromising material on the opponent for favorable
treatment in the international community. The candidate does so
expecting an exchange of benefits from the transaction.199
195

See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 193.
Id.
197 Id.
198 For a discussion on the elements of actus rea, see https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/actu
s_reus; for a discussion on the elements of mens rea, see https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/me
ns_rea.
199 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, vol. I, p.181.
196
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What is more, a president may be the subject of a criminal
investigation. That president then uses his executive power to
frustrate, interfere, and obstruct the proceedings and operations of that
investigation. He does so with the corrupt intent to end the
investigation.
Such examples would fit within Aristotle’s definition of a
voluntary act. The President would (1) know what he is doing (i.e.,
interfering with an investigation) and (2) bring about that action (i.e.,
for the purpose of ending the investigation). Thus, refusing to hold
that agent accountable insults basic notions of criminal accountability
and morality that attend our legal system.
In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines justice,
the role of justice in our society, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for justice to exist, and its implications.200 First, Rawls reasons that
justice is “a proper balance of competing claims from a conception of
justice as a set of related principles for identifying the relevant
considerations which determine this balance.”201 He further states that:
(1) people must negotiate and agree on the principles or a conception
of justice and (2) there are institutions that generally satisfy these
principles.202
The subject of justice, Rawls argues, is to assign rights and
duties and determine what the proper benefits and burdens of social
cooperation.203 It is from this assignment of rights and calculation of
burdens that laws, institutional regulations, and norms arise. One need
not wonder either long or far to find the burdens of participation in our
society. For instance, one burden of participating in our society is to
abide by the laws and regulations, whether or not you agree with all of
them. Deviation from this norm leads to accountability under our laws.
The justification here stems from a set of propositions.
Laws are an agreed upon set of rules that prohibit and permit
behaviors. The purposes of laws are numerous. At their core, laws
govern actors in a geopolitically defined area. The business of such
governing in a democracy like the United States is negotiated. One
might reasonably posit it is as in the interest of prosperity and cohesion.
Thus, a deviation from such agreed rules would be to subvert the means
of our collective goals.
200
201
202
203

RAWLS, supra note 194.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
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Further, if the agreement is born from a negotiation concerning
the rights and duties of individuals, the negotiation would be the agreed
means to establish appropriate behavior. Deviant actions offend both
the process and the results of the negotiation. As such, it would be in
the interest of society to prevent that actor from further frustrating its
goals.
Even more concerning is the idea of deferment as a
disarmament of what would otherwise be an effort to secure a just
society. Where laws are the swords and shields of just people against
tyranny and corruption, deferment is its seizure. What are the tools of
securing a just state when they are stripped from the hands of good
people? A righteous society would be secured by righteous means.
Consequently, no one, not even the President of the United States, can
be above the law. It is such immunity that births unrighteousness.
It is not clear that actors in our society have negotiated an
agreement that provides the president with immunity from his criminal
behavior. For instance, there are no laws clearly providing such a
privilege. Even the Supreme Court held that a president must comply
with court orders in criminal actions, and that a sitting president is
liable for unofficial conduct.204 Moreover, the institutions that satisfy
principles of justice would be unable to do their job.205 At its core,
deferring the prosecution of a sitting president offends basic notions of
justice and responsibility which have underpinned the western world
for thousands of years. There is seemingly no shred of even a slightly
redeeming moral principle on which to justify deferment. Deferment
of prosecution subverts the negotiated principles of justice and the
institutions society established to define those principles.

204

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S 683 (1974).
MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II., p.177 (“[I]mmunizing the President from the
generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings
would seriously impair Congress’s power to enact laws ‘to promote objectives within [its]
constitutional authority.’” (alteration in original)); id. at 176-77 (“In Nixon, the Court rejected
the President’s claim of absolute executive privilege because ‘the allowance of the privilege
to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.’”); id. at
177 (“[T]he grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from
corrupt acts.”).
205

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/7

30

Maggio: Criminal Accountability

2019
VI.

CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY

787

CONCLUSION

Article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, along with the
25th Amendment, provide adequate provisions to replace a president
when he cannot discharge his duties. However, two OLC memoranda
argue that an indictment against a president would severely impair that
executive’s ability to carry out his constitutional duties.206 Those
memoranda are seemingly consistent with Justice Kavanaugh’s views,
as expressed in his law review article, that an indictment would
hamstring a government’s ability to function.207 Thus, both the OLC
memos and Justice Kavanaugh’s article conclude that an indictment
against a sitting president should be deferred until after the executive
leaves office.
Nevertheless, the author of this Note presents historical reasons
that support indicting a president while in office. To the extent that an
indictment could undercut the president’s ability to discharge his
duties, the 25th Amendment provides the appropriate framework,
which has been invoked successfully in the past. The United States
government has utilized replacement procedures on several occasions.
Additionally, presidential cooperation with judicial orders, such as
subpoenas and depositions, has repeatedly occurred without major
disruption. This nation witnessed the many great domestic and foreign
achievements of an administration plagued by either death or legal
disability of a president. Neither death of a president nor disability has
impaired the government from continuing to function. Finally, an
independent study highlights how one should not look to impeachment
provisions as a preclusion to a president’s accountability in criminal
law. Thus, an indictment should serve as no exception
Textual commitments in the Constitution support the
conclusion that a president is, in fact, indictable. Article 1, section 3
clause 7 of the Constitution explicitly makes the president an indictable
officer.208 This Note argues that a prosecutor need not wait until an
impeachment conviction to indict a sitting president. Likewise, article
2, section 1, clause 6 empowers Congress to remove a president under
certain conditions.209 One such condition is when the president suffers

206
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208
209

Supra notes 24, 26.
Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1460.
Supra note 35.
Supra note 24.
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a disability.210 The author sets forth the idea of indictment as a
disability sufficient for removal and replacement under the 25th
Amendment.
Moreover, a philosophical analysis of the issue lends itself to
the view that deferment of criminal accountability because of one’s
title offends basic notions of morality and fairness that underpin our
society. The lack of clear laws and regulations on the matter suggests
there is no consensus in our society concerning what is a just answer
to the issue. Refusing to hold someone accountable for an intentional
criminal act that originated in his mind and that he reasonably knew
the effects of, contravenes both the actus rea and mens rea elements
of our criminal system. Deferment is fundamentally at odds with
western beliefs of accountability.
Most important, there are major policy concerns regarding a
lack of action taken against criminally inclined presidents, serving at
the helm of our government. It is only to society’s detriment that
Congress could effectively insulate a president’s removal from office
following an impeachment. Impeachment is not a sufficient remedy
because, politically, it may not be possible to secure the requisite twothirds vote necessary for conviction. This serves to keep a person, who
has engaged in criminal behavior, with the gambit of executive power
at his disposal, in office. Our experiences with President Nixon, and
his proclivity for cover-ups, indicate why inaction against a criminally
inclined president is problematic.
The Mueller investigation unearthed evidence that close
colleagues of the president engaged in criminal activity. According to
the Special Counsel’s report, there is evidence that the President
obstructed justice. The United States currently has a president who
allegedly coordinated with a foreign adversary in securing dirt on a
political opponent. Further, allegations detail that Russia laundered
money into the Trump campaign. Lastly, some accuse President
Trump of firing former FBI Chief, James Comey, and former United
States Attorney for the Southern District in New York, Preet Bharara,
in an attempt to obstruct justice. Mueller found that President Trump
directed Don McGhan and Jeff Sessions to exercise their power in
either limiting the Special Counsel’s scope or to fire Mueller. It should
be patently obvious how accepting aid from a foreign adversary, and
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then undermining an effort to expose that collusion, is an existential
threat to the United States.
In sum, not only does the Constitution provide for replacing a
disabled sitting president, but our laws and history support the view
that presidents can be held criminally accountable. A thorough
analysis of the policy and moral implications of the issue command it.
It is not only permissible, but imperative, that we hold our chief
executive accountable for his criminal behavior. No one, no matter
their title, their position in government, their power, is above the
law.211 Thus, prosecutors can, and should, bring indictments and let
the Supreme Court resolve the constitutionality of such action.
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